We commonly see the killing of human beings, except in cases of true self-defense, as a horrendous moral crime deserving the most severe legal punishment. Yet, we commonly accept that individuals have a legal right to kill persons on a large scale once some legitimate authority, in particular the state, puts them in uniform, provides them with weapons, and commands them to execute a war. What is remarkable and morally questionable concerning this "combatant's privilege" is that international law and custom grant it irrespective of the reasons behind the war. In other words, soldiers have a right to kill whether their fight is an act of pure aggression or an act of pure self-defense. To be sure, the combatant's right to kill is restricted in that it is a war crime to deliberately kill enemy noncombatants, notably civilians not directly engaged in defense and soldiers hors de combat. However, it still means that the war convention grants combatants authorized by their governments to fight a war of aggression the legal right to kill enemy soldiers who rightfully seek to protect their country and fellow citizens. Moreover, the war convention permits these aggressor soldiers to indirectly kill enemy civilians in pursuit of their military objectives as long as this "collateral damage" is proportional to the importance of these objectives.
A major argument in support of combatant's privilege is Michael Walzer's doctrine of the "moral equality of soldiers." On his account, soldiers fighting in wars of aggression and defensive wars have the same moral status because they both typically believe that justice is on their side, and their moral choices are equally severely restricted by the overwhelming coercive powers of the state, including propaganda, conscription, and harsh penalties for the refusal to fight. Granted that soldiers, especially in democratic societies with professional volunteer armies, can be held morally culpable for fighting a war of aggression, should they be denied combatant's privilege? Moral culpability of aggressor soldiers establishes a necessary condition for modifying combatant's privilege, not a sufficient one. Indeed, the recent critics of Walzer's doctrine of the moral equality of soldiers have argued against modifying this privilege. For them, it is simply important as such to establish that soldiers may be culpable, or the argument's main pay-off is that some soldiers may refuse to fight in a war of aggression. What holds these critics back from challenging the current laws of war?
McMahan offers in synoptic fashion three arguments against the notion that combatant's privilege might be denied to aggressor soldiers so that they become appropriate subjects for some form of punishment: First, it is simply impossible for one country, or even an international body, to provide fair trials for all the members of an army. Second, there is the problem of "victor's justice": the winning side will declare its war to have been just and will be tempted to seek vengeance against vanquished soldiers under the guise of punishment. Third, if all combatants have to fear this fate, they may be deterred from surrendering; and it is irrational to establish incentives to protract wars rather than to terminate them. Let me first address the last two objections since they have less weight. It is correct that it is important not to provide incentives for lengthening wars by discouraging surrender, but it is even more important in terms of reducing human suffering to provide incentives for not initiating wars of aggression in the first place.
The prosecution of unjust combatants will reduce the willingness of combatants to participate in wars of aggression, especially in the case of professional volunteer armies. 4 Of course, the prosecution of the leaders of wars of aggression also has this impact, but the two are not exclusive and the prosecution of soldiers may be more effective in the long run. After all, it is more difficult for aggressor combatants to escape prosecution than it is for political and military leaders. The problem of a reduced incentive for surrendering by soldiers who fear prosecution can also be rebutted directly by a stipulation that surrender is a ground for dropping prosecution charges of aggressor combatancy or for reducing the penalty. The disincentive for not committing traditional war crimes can be removed in a similar way by making the penalty of aggressor combatancy a much less severe one. This is also morally imperative in that in general more extenuating circumstances are in place for committing the wrong of fighting in a war of aggression than in committing traditional war crimes.
The first two objections against changing combatant's privilege involving the problems of feasibility and "victor's justice" can best be met by articulating fair and feasible procedures for determining and prosecuting aggressor combatancy. What follows is a cautious and preliminary proposal in this direction, mindful of the fact that we should avoid taking a step backward toward a vision of war as a punitive enterprise.
Suppose that a country prepares to go to war (and so the war is not a war of cut. So, for the sake of global peace, we should at least be willing to reconsider unrestricted combatant's privilege, rather than treat it as a humanitarian dogma.
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